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Opinion TRENDS in Cognitive Sciences Vol.11 No.9A new framework for the study of the human moral
faculty is currently receiving much attention: the so-
called ‘universal moral grammar’ framework. It is based
on an intriguing analogy, first pointed out by Rawls,
between the study of the human moral sense and
Chomsky’s research program into the human language
faculty. To assess UMG, we ask: is moral competence
modular? Does it have an underlying hierarchical gram-
matical structure? Does moral diversity rest on culture-
dependant parameters? We review the evidence and
argue that formal grammatical concepts are of limited
value for the study of moral judgments, moral develop-
ment and moral diversity.
Introduction
The task of moral psychology is to provide an account of the
mechanisms underlying human moral judgments. A new
framework for moral psychology is currently receiving
much attention: the so-called ‘universal moral grammar’
(UMG) [1–3]. First considered by Rawls [4], it relies on an
intriguing analogy between the study of moral cognition
and Chomsky’s linguistics research program called gen-
erative linguistics [5,6]. Given the impressive achieve-
ments of generative linguistics in the investigation of
the human language faculty (HLF), UMG deserves serious
consideration. Here we assess UMG and argue that the
formal grammatical concepts proposed by Chomsky are
unlikely to throw much light onto the psychological mech-
anisms that underliemoral judgments, moral development
and moral diversity.
Chomsky’s revolution in linguistics
The starting point of generative linguistics is the fact that
speakers of anyhuman language are able tounderstandand
produce novel sentences that they have never perceived
before. Furthermore, it rests on three major premises.
First, Chomsky [5,6] argued that a speaker’s ability to
understand and produce novel sentences depends on
her tacit knowledge of a grammatical system, of which
the speaker is totally unaware. Generative linguistics
investigates the computational properties of this deeplyCorresponding author: Dupoux, E. (dupoux@lscp.ehess.fr).
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www.sciencedirect.com 1364-6613/$ – see front matter  2007 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserveunconscious grammatical system. Its task, therefore, is
sharply demarcated from what Chomsky [7] calls the
‘ethno-scientific’ study of a speaker’s explicit (folk or naı¨ve)
metalinguistic beliefs about his or her language.
Second, the grammar of a language is a finite system of
recursive rules whereby an unbounded set of sentences can
be generated from a finite lexicon (Figure 1a). As Chomsky
pointed out, the evidence shows that this grammatical
system is dedicated to language processing and encapsu-
lated from explicit beliefs: a speaker’s grammatical com-
petence is a modular cognitive system [6,7].
Third, all human children manage to acquire knowledge
of their language from a finite and fragmentary sample.
From this phenomenon, called the ‘poverty of the stimulus’,
Chomsky argued that the initial state of the HLF must
include innate knowledge of a so-called ‘universal grammar’
(UG), that is, a set of universal computational principles
that guide a child towards the appropriate grammatical
generalizations [7]. Thus, Chomsky’s nativism grounds
the study of the HLF into human biology.
This research program has given rise to the so-called
‘principles-and-parameters’ approach to linguistic diver-
sity, according to which UG (the initial state of the HLF) is
conceived as a fixed, species-specific and task-specific (i.e.
modular) network of computational principles connected to
a finite set of binary parameters, each of which can occupy
one of two positions (e.g. either ‘head first’ or ‘head last’).
Each human language turns out to instantiate a particular
setting of the parameters [7,8].
Universal moral grammar: a fascinating prospect
Given the achievements of generative linguistics in
addressing language acquisition and linguistic diversity,
addressing moral development and the diversity of moral
belief systems from the standpoint of UMG, that is, amoral
psychological framework based on the analogy between the
humanmoral faculty and theHLF, seems to be a promising
strategy. As advocates of UMG point out [1–3], humans are
able to assess the moral properties of an unbounded set of
social interactions, and UMG can be usefully organized
around five main questions, each of which has a counter-
part in generative linguistics: (i) What is the structure of
human moral competence? (ii) How is it acquired by a
human child? (iii) How is it put to use in human action?d. doi:10.1016/j.tics.2007.07.001
Figure 1. (a). The language faculty is separable from speakers’ explicit metalinguistic beliefs and justifications. It is a computational system that is based on a lexicon and a
set of recursive rules and whose task is to relate phonological and semantic representations. This modular system gives rise to speakers’ grammatical intuitions (or
judgments) about sentences in their languages. (b) The moral faculty (a tentative model). The task of the moral faculty is to deliver stable moral judgments on the basis of
potentially conflicting intuitions that are automatically elicited by the perception of social interactions. These intuitions depend on representations of the causal, intentional
and emotional content of perceived human interactions (Box 1). If and when a conflict arises among competing intuitions, moral judgment emerges from a process of
adjudication (Box 1). Moral judgments serve as input to metacognitive processes of justification that operate on explicit moral beliefs. These beliefs can in turn have top-
down effects on the computation of judgments: (i) Social information from narratives or imagined situations can contribute to intuitions as either non-perceptual inputs to
the causal/intentional/emotional system or as an empathetic modulation of perceived emotional signals (Box 1). (ii) These explicit beliefs can clash with intuitive responses
(Box 1). (iii) Resolution of moral dilemmas might be biased by explicit moral beliefs that are culture-specific (Box 1). Top-down modulation of judgments by explicit moral
beliefs shows that, unlike the language faculty, the moral faculty is not modular, even if it draws on the resources of social cognitive components, which are modular.
374 Opinion TRENDS in Cognitive Sciences Vol.11 No.9(iv) How is it realized in the human brain? (v) How did it
evolve in the human species?
Three results from the empirical study of moral
judgment seem to support the UMG program for research
into the moral faculty. First, as exemplified by what Haidt
[9,10] has called ‘moral dumbfounding’, people often exhi-
bit strong moral convictions for which they cannot offer
explicit justifications (Box 1). Similarly, people are unable
to justify their grammatical judgments.
Second, as Turiel [11] has argued, unlike social
conventional rules, which depend on the acceptance of
some social authority and are revisable at the authority’s
request, moral norms are not revisable at some authority’s
request (Box 1). In this respect, moral judgments are like
grammatical judgments.
Finally, examination of so-called ‘trolley dilemmas’
suggests that moral judgments might, like grammatical
judgments, depend on complex and unconscious compu-
tations involving abstract hierarchical structures. For
example, examination of the minimal contrast between
the trolley dilemmas, respectively called Loop Track and
Man-in-Front (Box 1), shows that moral judgments depend
on whether some consequence of an action was intended or
merely foreseen by the agent [2,3,12–14].
None of this evidence, however, shows that the
mechanisms underlying moral judgments make use of
moral information encoded in a dedicated moral grammar.
To probe the UMG research framework, we first address
the issue of whethermoral competence is amodular systemwww.sciencedirect.comseparable from an agent’s explicit moral beliefs. Second, we
examine whether moral competence is best conceived as a
recursive grammatical system of computations. Third, we
examine the idea that moral diversity can be derived from
a system of universal principles and binary parameters.
How modular is moral competence?
The top-down modulation of moral judgments
One piece of evidence for the modularity of grammatical
competence is that speakers’ grammatical judgments are
independent of their explicit metalinguistic beliefs about
their language. The discovery of moral dumbfounding has
contributed to the emergence of so-called ‘dual process’
models of moral judgment [10,15–21]. On these models,
social intuitions, which subsequently serve as inputs
to moral judgments, are automatically generated in
response to the perception of human interactions
(Figure 1b). For example, Haidt’s [10,18,19] ‘social intui-
tionist’ model is based on the separation between the
processes underlying respectively moral judgments and
explicit justifications. Arguably, moral justifications are
meta-cognitive processes operating on explicit moral
beliefs.
However, processes of moral justification have been
scrutinized for centuries by moral philosophers from Plato
and Aristotle to anthropologists and were later investi-
gated by Piaget [22] and Kohlberg [23,24], and it would be
hard to claim that these processes do not belong to the
human moral faculty. Furthermore, moral dumbfounding
Box 1. The seven pieces of the moral puzzle
Moral dumbfounding
A brother and sister intend to make love with one another once and
only once in their life. They decide to keep it a secret between
themselves, and to take all protective measures against pregnancy,
and they both have a wonderful sensuous experience. Are the
siblings’ actions OK?
Most, if not all, of the subjects who judge the action morally
objectionable feel dumbfounded and find themselves utterly unable
to explain why [10].
Non-revisability at the request of a social authority
(i) Tom wears pajamas to go to school. Is it OK?
(ii) Tom hits the little girl next to him for no reason. Is it OK?
Suppose that the teacher said it was OK, would it now be OK to do (i)
or (ii)?
Adults and young children judge that, unlike violations of conven-
tions (i), violations of moral norms (ii) are wrong, even if an authority
decides it is OK [11,41,42].
The intentional complexity of trolley dilemmas
Bystander
A train is about to run over and kill five people walking on the tracks.
A bystander can flip a switch that will divert the train onto a sidetrack,
and save five but kill one person who is standing on the sidetrack. Is it
permissible to flip the switch? [14]
Footbridge
A train is about to run over and kill five people walking on the tracks.
A bystander standing on a footbridge can shove a large man onto the
tracks and thereby save five but kill the large man. Is it permissible to
shove the man? [14]
Loop Track
A train will run over five people. By flipping a switch, a bystander can
temporarily divert the train onto a sidetrack loop which goes back to the
main track, where the five people are standing. On the sidetrack there is
one person who will be killed by the train, thereby stopping the train
and saving five people. Is it permissible to flip the switch? [14]
Man-in-Front
Same as Loop Track, except that on the sidetrack there is a heavy
stone that will stop the train, thereby saving five people but killing one
person standing infront of it. Is it permissible to flip the switch?
(Mikhail, 2000, Rawls’ linguistic analogy, PhD dissertation, Cornell
University)
Even though the casualties are the same, people judge that it is
more permissible to sacrifice one person to save five in Bystander
than in Footbridge and in Man-in-Front than in Loop track. In each
pair, the relevant contrast is between causing one person’s death as
an intended consequence or merely as a foreseen consequence of the
agent’s act [2,3,12–14].
The dissonance between intuitions and explicit moral beliefs
 We are positively biased toward members of our in-group
(relatives, kin, social or ethnic group) and negatively biased toward
members of an out-group [27]. In pre-industrial societies, hostile
behavior toward members of out-groups is often praised and
morally sanctioned. A less explicit version of such biases is
demonstrated in cultures where impartiality is highly praised [25].
Race-related biases can be revealed by implicit measures that fail to
correlate with explicit racist or anti-racist beliefs [26].
 Survivors of catastrophes can experience a strong sense of guilt,
even if, according to their reflective moral standpoint, they believe
that they share no responsibility for the victims’ fate – this is the
‘survivor guilt’ syndrome, part of the Post Traumatic Stress
Disorder syndrome [43].
The cognitive cost of moral dilemmas
 A loved one is suffering from a disease for which there is no known
cure and which causes her insufferable pain. Should you put an end
to her suffering by abbreviating her life?
 Alternatively, suppose that there is a cure for the disease, but the
medicine is so expensive that you cannot afford it. Should you steal
the medicine? [23,24]
Such dilemmas arise from the experience of conflicting intuitions (e.g.
relieving pain versus avoiding stealing). Contrary to perceptual or
linguistic ambiguities, the solution of such conflicts is not automatic
but requires effortful strategic thinking.
Empathetic modulation
Empathy with the victim
A person has just been unfair to you. You know that he receives an
electric shock when this happens. Your empathy for him and your
empathetic brain response correlate negatively with the degree to
which you judge his pain to be well deserved [44].
Empathy with the agent
In some cultures, when crimes of passion are committed under the
influence of emotions (such as jealousy), they are considered as more
permissible and are less harshly punished than cold-blooded crimes.
In other cultures, so-called ‘honor killings’ are planned, premeditated
and ritually accomplished. In cultures of both types, members of the
local community might empathize more with the agent’s emotions
than with the victim’s, thereby modulating the perceived gravity of
the crime (pp.142–155) [2].
Lack of empathy in psychopaths
Adults and children with psychopathic tendencies are impaired in the
recognition of sad and/or fearful emotions and show no behavioral
empathy and no empathetic brain responses to others’ pain or
distress. They also fail to distinguish moral from conventional norms
[30,32,45].
Moral diversity
 In different cultures, by and large, humans seem to exhibit the same
automatic, encapsulated, emotional responses to social interac-
tions [46]. Cultural anthropologists propose that moral systems are
based on a small set of universal moral values (cf. Shweder’s three-
fold distinction between the ethics of autonomy, community and
divinity) [34,35].
 Across different cultures, systems of justifications for moral
decisions appeal to different supernatural intentional agents, such
as gods, spirits or ancestors, posited by distinct religious belief
systems. According to Boyer [49] (pp.120) and Atran [47] (pp.110–
112), imagining empathetic support from a supernatural intentional
agent may facilitate the adjudication of moral dilemmas and the
justification of hard moral decisions [48].
 Shweder et al. [36] studied preferences for sleeping arrangements
among Indian and North-American middle-class families with five
children of both sexes and two parents. They found that, given
constraints on the number of rooms, the choices of Indian families
revealed the following preference ordering among moral values: (i)
incest avoidance, (ii) protection of the vulnerable, (iii) female chastity
anxiety. By contrast, the choices of middle-class North American
families revealed the following preference ordering: (i) incest
avoidance, (ii) sacred couple (parents’ privacy), (iii) children’s
autonomy.
Opinion TRENDS in Cognitive Sciences Vol.11 No.9 375is consistent with the fact that many moral judgments
depend on an agent’s explicit beliefs about morality. For
example, one can override one’s intuitive biases in favor of
members of one’s in-group and against members of
some out-group and produce a judgment in accordance
with one’s explicit preference for moral impartiality
(Box 1) [25–27].www.sciencedirect.comIf an agent’smoral judgments can depend on her explicit
moral beliefs and preferences, then there can be no sharp
demarcation between the scientific investigation of the
human moral faculty and the ‘ethnoscientific’ study of
people’s naı¨ve explicit moral beliefs. If not, then one major
step toward the assumption that moral judgments derive
from tacit knowledge of a moral grammar is missing.
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A speaker’s intuitions about the grammatical properties of
a sentence exhaust, and are constitutive of, that person’s
grammaticality judgments (Figure 1a). They are generated
quickly, automatically and effortlessly. However, the exist-
ence of moral dilemmas shows the possibility of a gap
between one’s intuitions about the moral properties of
an action and moral judgment. Moral dilemmas arise from
a conflict between two or more deeply felt obligations
pulling in opposite directions (Box 1). As emphasized by
Greene [15–17,20,21] and other advocates of dual-process
models, intuitions are based on distinct, fast, automatic,
emotional mechanisms that react specifically to certain
social situations. If and when conflicts arise among com-
peting intuitions, the task of moral judgment is to adjudi-
cate them (Figure 1b). Because it is open to top-down
modulation, the process of moral adjudication can be time
consuming (Box 2).
Moral dilemmas have no counterpart in the HLF. When
a sentence of a natural language is syntactically or seman-
tically ambiguous, it has two or more underlying gramma-
tical structures. Because the ambiguity is automatically
resolved by pragmatic mechanisms operating on contex-
tual cues, ordinary speakers are rarely aware of it and it is
unlikely to disrupt the continuous flow of processing [28]. If
a speaker does become aware of it, then contrary to the case
of moral dilemmas, the person is unlikely to feel torn by the
experience of conflicting intuitions. In sum, moral compe-
tence does not seem to be modular in the relevant sense.
Is there a moral grammar?
We now argue that moral competence exhibits a feature
that grammars of natural languages lack and that it fails to
meet the requirements for having a grammatical structure.
Emotions and moral competence
The idea that a speaker’s linguistic competence has a
grammatical structure would be hard to reconcile with
the claim that emotions play a causal role in the generation
of grammatical intuitions. This is why Hauser [2,29]
argues that emotions belong to moral performance, not
competence. In his view, moral judgments cause emotions,
but not vice versa. Although the issue is not settled yet,
there is evidence that emotional responses contribute to
moral competence: not only do violations of moral norms
automatically elicit emotional responses, but as BlairBox 2. Questions for future research
 Is the moral competence of individuals who lack empathy
impaired? Or is the ability to empathize merely a necessary
condition for the acquisition of moral competence?
 Autistic individuals are impaired in their representation of the
psychological states of others. Are they ipso facto morally
incompetent?
 What are the social cognitive mechanisms underlying the
intuitions on which moral dilemmas rest?
 Are the processes of conflict resolution specific to moral
dilemmas?
 Could the notion of parameters be suitably modified, for instance
via the notion of constraint ranking [50], in order to explain cross-
cultural moral diversity?
www.sciencedirect.com[30–32] has argued, the lack of empathy with the distress
cues of victims interferes with normal moral development
in children with early psychopathic tendencies (Box 1 and
Box 2).
Four conditions of adequacy for moral grammar
Thebasic taskofagenerativegrammar is to characterize the
recursive mapping between pairs of phonological and
semantic representations for an infinite number of such
pairs from a given language. The mapping has at least four
features. First, the phonological and semantic properties of
a sentence are a function of the phonological and semantic
properties of their constituents. The grammatical (or syn-
tactic) mapping must therefore reflect the compositionality
of the phonological and semantic representations. Second,
because language is used as a communication system, the
mapping preserves information and is reversible: phonolo-
gical representations can be mapped onto semantic repres-
entations (comprehension) and semantic representations
can be mapped onto phonological representations (pro-
duction). Third, the information used in the psychological
processes implementing this mapping is encapsulated in
Fodor’s [33] sense, in that it depends on linguistic infor-
mation alone, not on general world knowledge. Fourth, the
grammar is domain-specific in that the linguistic rules are
unique to the HLF.
What could the computational task of MG be? Suppose
that MG maps the structural description of an agent’s act
onto its moral valence [3]. If so, then the question arises:
could the mapping satisfy the compositionality, reversibil-
ity, informational encapsulation and domain-specificity
requirements?
A complex action can be conceived as a function of its
constituents. But for two related reasons, the valence
assigned to an agent’s act cannot be a function of
the valences associated with its constituents. First, the
valence of an act lacks discrete constituents or a hierarch-
ical structure. Second, the component parts of a morally
valued complex act (e.g. opening a bottle, pouring the
contents in a tea cup, serving tea to a guest), might in
themselves carry no negative valence at all. Only if one
knew that the bottle contained poison would one assign a
negative valence to the act.
The mapping is not reversible; it makes sense to map
the structural description of an agent’s act onto a valence.
But it would make little (if any) sense to generate a
structural description of an act in response to the repres-
entation of the valence of that act.Morality is an evaluative
system, not a generative one.
The psychological processes implementing this hypothe-
tical mapping are unlikely to satisfy a strict informational
encapsulation requirement; any background information
about an action (e.g. knowledge of what a poison is, the past
actions of the agent and the victim, etc.) might affect moral
evaluation (see also Box 1).
Could MG be domain specific? We discuss two
possible arguments. First, it might seem as if Mikhail’s
[3] computational analysis of the Bystander example
shows that the structural description of an agent’s act
can only be mapped onto the valence of the agent by a
domain-specificMG, but it does not.WhatMikhail calls the
Table 1. The language faculty and the moral faculty
Language
faculty
Moral
faculty
Is it modular?
Gap between intuitions and judgments  +
Top down influences by explicit beliefs  +
Existence of costly dilemmas  +
Is it grammatical?
Compositionality + 
Bidirectionality + 
Modulation by emotions – +
Cross-cultural diversity
Shared set of basic intuitions  +
Parameters + 
Ontological variation  +
Opinion TRENDS in Cognitive Sciences Vol.11 No.9 377‘moral structure’ of the action is purported to be mechani-
cally derivable by so-called ‘moral transformations’ from
the underlying ‘causal structure’ of the action. Each of
these ‘causal structures’ turns out to be the semantic
structure of an English sentence describing the action (step
[d], Figure 2 of Mikhail [3]). The alleged moral transform-
ations turn out to be rewriten rules that insert a specific
moral predicate into these semantic structures (step [e]).
Far from showing that our intuitions about the moral
properties of actions are generated by a dedicated MG,
the analysis shows that the grammars of natural
languages have the resources to encode information about
some of an action’s properties that are relevant to moral
judgment.
Second, it might seem as if the minimal pair of trolley
dilemmas, called Loop Track and the Man-in-Front,
respectively (Box 1), reveals the domain specificity of the
intentional computations underlying moral evaluation,
but it does not. Moral judgments differ according to
whether the death of one victim, as a means to saving five,
was intended or foreseen. It is one thing to recognize that
this distinction is used as input to the process generating
moral judgment. It is quite another thing to claim that the
distinction is specific to moral cognition. Consider, for
example, the case of an agent planning to travel from place
A to place B. Whereas she intends to reach B, she merely
foresees going through several intermediary steps between
A and B. Here, the distinction is operative but lacks moral
import. Given that moral competence lacks a grammatical
structure, could UMG nonetheless address the issues of
moral development and moral diversity?
Moral diversity and parameters
The goal of the UMG research program is to investigate the
issues of moral development and moral diversity from the
standpoint of the principles-and-parameters framework.
Two conditions should be met: UMG should exist, and
moral diversity should be relevantly similar to linguistic
diversity.
By analogy with Chomsky’s argument for UG, the pov-
erty of the stimulus could only show the existence of UMG
if moral competence had a grammatical structure. But if
(as we have argued)moral competence lacks a grammatical
structure, then the poverty of the stimulus could only show
that moral competence has an innate basis.
For three related reasons, moral diversity seems
relevantly unlike linguistic diversity. First, linguists take
it that two speakers of two distinct languages can have
irreconcilably divergent grammatical intuitions (e.g. whe-
ther ornot nounsprecede adjectives).However, even though
members of two different cultures might disagree about
specific moral cases, the claim that such disagreements rest
on irreconcilably divergent social intuitions about human
interactions has not been substantiated. As recognized by
dual- process models, social intuitions result from a small
number of automatic and basic emotional processes, which
seem widely shared among members of different cultures
[34,35]. However, much cross-cultural moral diversity
instead reflects the processes of moral adjudication or con-
flict resolution among competing intuitions, which (as wewww.sciencedirect.comargued) are open to the modulation of explicit beliefs about
what is morally valuable (Figure 1b).
Second, the HLF takes discrete inputs, and linguistic
parameters can be conceived as binary switches with no
intrinsic value (semantic or otherwise); they can occupy one
of two opposite positions (of which speakers are completely
unaware), and their factorial interactions give rise to dis-
tinct languages. By contrast, both emotional responses and
the valence of an act are continuous variables (not binary
switches). Furthermore, as the anthropological evidence
suggests, moral diversity should be conceptualized not in
terms of the factorial combination of binary switches but
rather in terms of different preference orderings among
competingmembers of a finite set of universalmoral values,
some of which can be consciously accessed (Box 2). For
example, as Shweder et al. [36] showed, sleeping arrange-
ments among IndianandNorth-American families vary as a
functionof the relativeweightsgiven to suchmoral valuesas
‘female chastity anxiety’ and ‘children’s autonomy’ (Box 1).
Third, whereas speakers’ metalinguistic beliefs are not
part of the HLF, metacognitive processes of justification
operating on explicit moral beliefs are fully part of the
moral faculty. Unlike linguistic diversity, moral diversity
exhibits different ontological commitments often based on
different religious beliefs: people from different cultures
might invoke different supernatural agents (gods, spirits
or ancestors), whose imagined empathetic support contrib-
utes to the culture-specific justifications of moral decisions
(Box 1). This makes the moral faculty more like naı¨ve
arithmetic and folk biology [37–39] than like the HLF.
Concluding remarks
Aswehave argued (seeTable 1), explicitmoral beliefs fully
belong to themoral faculty, moral competence lacks gram-
matical structure, and the principles-and-parameters
framework cannot explain moral diversity. On the basis
of similar considerations, Rorty [40] has recently denied
that ‘morality is grounded in our biology’. However, many
cognitive mechanisms (e.g. color perception) lack a gram-
matical structure and are nonetheless grounded in our
biology. The fact that several premises in favor ofUMGare
missing shows that some major linguistic concepts (recur-
sivity, compositionality, parameters) are inappropriate
for the scientific investigation of the humanmoral faculty.
However, it does not show that moral competence is inde-
pendent from human biology, nor does it preclude a strong
378 Opinion TRENDS in Cognitive Sciences Vol.11 No.9nativist basis for moral competence. As we argued, moral
judgments emerge from automatic emotional responses
and complex computations tracking the intentional struc-
ture of social interactions. Rorty’s contention would
only be corroborated if there were evidence that human
emotions and human mind reading are not grounded in
human biology. We are aware of no such evidence.
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